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Abstract 
 
We document the role of independence for Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) as it 
matters to successful implementation of monetary policy. We compare the implementation of 
monetary policy pre- and post-crisis periods within an empirical framework which allows us to 
measure the role of independence quantitatively. We estimate a Taylor rule with time varying 
coefficients by employing a dual extended Kalman filter. We find that the coefficient of inflation 
gap has increased substantially since CBRT gained de-juro independence.
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1. Introduction 
 
Conducting monetary policy in an unstable macroeconomic environment characterized by a fairly 
dollarized economy, large and volatile capital flows due to weak macroeconomic fundamentals 
and rapidly changing global liquidity conditions has been a task faced by the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT) during the 1990s. This period featured chronic high inflation 
coupled with huge macroeconomic imbalances, and it ended with the twin financial crises of 
2000 and 2001 and several legal reforms one of which lead to the instrumental independence of 
CBRT.   In the post-crisis period CBRT has redefined its role and reverted to inflation targeting 
under stronger macroeconomic fundamentals and more favorable global liquidity conditions. The 
chronic high inflation fell to single digits. While the role of central bank and inflation-targeting 
regime in the post-crisis period in reducing inflation has been well researched, how much of this 
success owes to central bank independence remains largely unexplained.  In this article, we will 
attempt to document the role of central bank independence as it matters to successful 
implementation of monetary policy by comparing the implementation of monetary policy pre- 
and post-crisis period and by providing an empirical framework which allows us to measure the 
role of independence quantitatively. 
 
Based on the previous empirical works on Turkey, in terms of the challenges faced by the CBRT 
and the differences in the choice of monetary policy targets, one may actually divide the post-
financial account liberalization period (1989-2008) into three sub-periods.  
 
The pre-1999 macroeconomic instability period was characterized by high and chronic inflation, 
volatile real output growth performance due to dependence on short-term financial flows as a 
major source of external financing, weakly regulated banking sector, soft budget constraints and 
fragmented party system as well as populist cycles.1 During this period CBRT was not an 
independent institution and monetary policy was subordinate to fiscal policy in an environment 
with high public sector borrowing requirement of the governments.   
                                                 
1 For a detailed documentation of major developments in the Turkish economy in the post-financial account 
liberalization and pre-2000 period, see, among others, Alper and Onis (2003a, 2003b, 2004), Alper and Saglam 
(2001), Cizre-Sakallıoglu and Yeldan (2000), Ersel (1996) Ertugrul and Selcuk (2001), Kibritcioglu (2004), Onis 
(1998), and Onis and Rubin (2003). 
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The second sub-period is the 2000-2001 period in which the launching of the three-year 
stabilization program backed by the International Monetary Fund took place. During this period, 
the sole purpose of the monetary policy was to facilitate the three-year exchange rate based 
stabilization program that was launched at the beginning of 2000. The program ended abruptly  
as a result of the twin financial crises on November 2000 and February 2001.2 In the immediate 
aftermath of the February 2001 crisis, the “Transition to Strong Economy Program” was 
launched which involved several reforms focusing on reducing uncertainties in the financial 
markets and restructuring the banking sector as well as switching to a flexible exchange regime. 
With the amendment of the Central Bank Law in April 2001, the CBRT was given the de jure 
(legal) instrument independence which enabled the central bank to set the monetary policy 
autonomously. The Monetary Policy Committee was also established in order to set the inflation 
target in cooperation with the government. The main goal of the CBRT was defined as 
maintaining price stability. 
 
The post-crisis period has been characterized by stronger macro fundamentals, institutional 
reforms and a relatively conducive international global liquidity conditions following the 
monetary easing in the U.S. in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks.  
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
Table 1 depicts the evolution and the decomposition of the Turkish Public Sector Debt in the 
post-2001 period. Some key reflections on this table can be stated as follows: Following the 
financial crisis in February of 2001, the banking sector was restructured and troubled banks were 
taken over by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund and since these were recapitalized through 
issuance of non-cash debt by the Treasury, the total public sector debt to GDP ratio climbed to 
the unprecedentedly high level of 74.13% by the end of 20013. If one adds the foreign exchange 
indexed domestic debt to GDP to the external debt to GDP ratio, the figure would stand at 
                                                 
2 See Alper (2001) for a brief account of the major developments during the first year of the stabilization program. 
3 The calculations are made using the new definition of the GDP which was released in 2008 by the Turkish 
Statistical Institute. When the previous definition of the Turkish GDP was used, the 2001 total public debt to GDP 
ratio figure stood well in excess of 90%.  
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41.37% of GDP in 2001 reflecting the exchange rate sensitive portion of the total public debt. 
While nominal yield bonds stood at 7.39% of the GDP, the inflation indexed real yield bonds 
stood at 25.37% of GDP in 2001 reflecting the inflation-averse attitude of the investors following 
two decades of chronic inflation. The public debt picture is much improved when we consider the 
final column of Table 1. The total public sector debt to GDP ratio has declined drastically and 
stood at 37.58% while the exchange rate sensitive portion of the debt was 11.73% by end-June 
2008. While the total public sector debt to GDP ratio and the real yield bonds almost halved, the 
ratio of the nominal yield bonds to GDP almost doubled and now stands at 13.42% by 2008.  
 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
Following the financial liberalization when the Turkish Lira was made fully convertible in 
August 1989, Turkey experienced mostly short-term inflows and real appreciation of domestic 
currency. The financial account openness period coincided with the high public sector borrowing 
requirement financed in part through seigniorage resulting in high and chronic inflation, and in 
part through debt issuance resulting in high ex-ante real interest rates. Seigniorage financing 
coupled with financial openness led the household sector to substitute domestic currency 
holdings with foreign ones, referred in the literature as dollarization. Public debt issuance form of 
financing coupled with financial openness led the banking sector to have open positions 
(borrowing in foreign currency and lending in domestic currency) in an environment of a real 
appreciated currency and high real interest rates. As can be observed from Figure 1 however, a 
reverse currency substitution took place and the ratio of foreign exchange deposits to the broad 
definition of money supply declined monotonically from an average of 88% for the 1995-2001 
period to 45% as of end-September 2008.  
 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
 
Arguably, the improvements in macro fundamentals such as the significant reduction in the 
public debt to GDP ratio and inflation rates as well as the reverse currency substitution could 
have been a statistical artifact due to the favorable environment in global liquidity conditions in 
the post-September 2001 financial easing period, or in other words, a result of good luck rather 
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than good policy.4 As can be observed from Figure 2, excluding the subprime crisis episode of 
the late 2008, the average emerging market sovereign bond spread as well as the Turkish 
sovereign bond spreads declined almost monotonically in the post-2001 period. The average 
emerging market bond spread which gives information on cost of borrowing i.e., how much of a 
risk premium an average emerging market treasury needs to pay over and above the U.S. 
Treasury while issuing a Eurobond denominated in USD with comparable maturity, stood at 820 
basis points (8.20%) during the 1998-2001 period while the same spread was 380 basis points 
(3.80%) during the January 2002-October 2008 period.  Some part of this reduction in cost of 
borrowing may be due to institutional reforms and better policies in the emerging market 
economies, however, an increase in the risk-appetite of the global financial investors in an 
environment of financial easing and hence reduced yields in developed economies could have 
been the driving force. Figure 2 also underlines that the Turkish experience of a nearly sustained 
increase in financial inflows and reduction in the cost of borrowing is not a unique experience 
during the 2002-2008 period. Moreover it is possible to see the relative Turkish performance by 
analyzing the plot of the average emerging market economy bond spread less the Turkish spread. 
 
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
  
Figure 3 depicts that surprisingly Turkish Treasury was actually able to borrow cheaper than the 
average emerging market economy during the 1998-2001 period (exactly 272 basis points or 
2.72% cheaper) while during the 2002-2008 period Turkish cost of borrowing is almost identical 
to the emerging market average.5 This surprising result can be explained in two different ways. 
Either the sovereign bond market participants did not price the Turkish risk premium during the 
1998-2000 period correctly, or an average emerging market economy fared better than Turkey in 
                                                 
4 Observed increase in capital inflows in the post-2002 period led to appreciation of the domestic currency both in 
nominal and in real terms in a floating exchange rate regime. Nominal appreciation contributed to the improvement 
of Turkish macroeconomic fundamentals on a number of fronts: the value of foreign exchange linked domestic debt 
and external debt declined in terms of domestic currency (debt sustainability); the value of foreign deposits 
expressed in domestic currency declined in value relative to domestic deposits (de-dollarization); the price of 
imported goods in the basket of consumer goods comprising the consumer price index (lower inflation).  
5 There are 2 spikes of importance that caused higher spreads on Turkish Eurobonds during the 2002-2008 period: 
the first is the deterioration in health condition of PM Ecevit in 2002 and the resulting uncertainty in the political 
arena. The second spike is the rejection by the Turkish Parliament to allow U.S. troops to use Turkish bases for a 
military attack on Iraq in March 2003. Excluding those two episodes will actually reduce the spreads of the Turkish 
Eurobonds. 
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the 2002-2008 period. In any case, the above results suggest that the improvement in 
macroeconomic imbalances occurred in the face of deteriorating borrowing conditions for 
Turkey, suggesting that  the role of monetary policy has been rather instrumental. Therefore, 
rather than scrutinizing the Turkish case in a comparative way to other emerging market 
economies, we will focus on causes of improving economic fundamentals in Turkey other than 
improving global liquidity conditions in the 2002-2008 period. 
 
Specifically, this paper is an endeavor to determine the importance of good policy in the Turkish 
case for the 2002-2008 period. In particular, we will focus on the importance of the monetary 
policy, its relation to the institutional reforms taken in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 
financial crisis in February in reducing the high and chronic inflation to single digit levels. 
During the analysis we will attempt to tackle the issue of how the de facto (actual) independence 
of the CBRT fared following the de jure independence granted in 2001. In other words, we will 
attempt to focus on “deeds rather than words”, within an empirical framework.  
 
After the soft peg was abandoned and the flexible exchange regime was adopted and the de jure 
independence of the CBRT was granted in 2001, the CBRT adopted an implicit inflation 
targeting (IT) regime during the 2002-2005 period followed by an explicit IT regime since 2006.6   
 
Section 2 will outline the literature on central bank independence. Section 3 of the paper will 
briefly summarize the developments that took place during the initial and later phases of the IT 
regime implementation while section 4 will introduce the notion of the Central Bank reaction 
function. The previous literature on the conduct of monetary policy suggests the possible 
inconsistency of two or more targets for a central bank. For an independent central bank 
following an IT regime, a relatively high weight should be placed to inflation credibility gap. The 
technical part of this study will focus on the relative importance of the weights of output gap, 
inflation credibility gap and the real exchange rate and how these weights evolve across the three 
aforementioned periods within the context of Turkey. In particular, a priori, one would expect the 
relative weight of inflation deviation from its target to be smaller for the periods when the central 
                                                 
6 Among others see Kara and Ogunc (2005), Kara (2006) and Ersel and Ozatay (2008) on issues pertaining to 
inflation targeting in the post-2002 period. 
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bank is relatively less independent and the monetary policy is subordinate to fiscal policy so that 
output gap and perhaps real exchange rate receives higher priority. Based on this empirical 
analysis, we plan to provide evidence to the evolution of the degree of independence of CBRT 
since 1995. Section 5 presents the data used, the estimation results. Section 6 includes the 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Brief Review of Literature on Central Bank Independence 
 
Central bank independence, which is used interchangeably with “policy independence”, can be 
defined as the flexibility given to the central bank in the formulation and execution of monetary 
policy and freedom from being dictated by political considerations. However, this definition 
should not be taken to mean that the government cannot comment on the stance of the monetary 
policies or the central bank cannot consult with the government on these issues. Broadly 
speaking, given the definition above, an independent central bank is more likely to implement a 
restrictive monetary policy and to signal the future course of policy with greater credibility 
resulting in lower uncertainty. 
 
Debelle and Fischer (1994) classifies central bank independence into instrument independence 
and goal independence. Instrument independence refers to the independence of the central bank 
in using the monetary policy tools and is generally viewed as “desirable” in the literature. Goal 
independence on the other hand, such as aiming price stability and/or output stability, is generally 
deemed as “undesirable”. Based on accountability grounds, it is argued that since governments 
are elected from a democratic process, the goals of a central bank should be assigned by the 
government. The central bank should be free in its choice of means to achieve these goals, 
whereas the governments are responsible for monitoring the performance of the central bank in 
fulfilling these goals (successfully). It is also argued that the higher the degree of delegation of 
decision-making in monetary policy, the more explicit monetary devices should be, to provide 
accountability to the public. 
 
A successful implementation of IT requires being able to set a credible target in advance and to 
do so in successive years without government influence.. Additionally, it also requires the ability 
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to change instruments to achieve the preset target whenever necessary. The first of these 
requirements calls for goal independence, and the second, instrument independence. Therefore, 
one can say that a successful IT requires full independence of the central bank. The public 
announcement of an inflation target by a central bank necessitates the central bank to act, at least 
in principle, in conformity to some rules. In an IT regime, for example, these rules are frequent 
announcements concerning how and why the central bank adjusts its policy rate, or revises 
inflation targets and inflationary expectations. Such announcements are binding for the central 
bank and can be made credibly only if the central bank is perceived as independent by the private 
and public agents. 
 
Previous empirical literature reports a negative relation between average inflation and central 
bank independence.7 One may presume that since there may be a trade-off between output 
stabilization and inflation stabilization, higher central bank independence may bring about real 
costs. However, a higher degree of central bank autonomy is found to be unrelated with higher 
variation in output growth for developed economies by Alesina and Summers (1993), and for 
OECD economies by Grilli et al. (1991).  
 
The issue of central bank independence has been approached from other directions as well. Some 
studies have focused on the proper measurement of central bank independence. Posen (1995), for 
instance, suggests that the measurement of central bank independence in such studies based on 
legal codings may not be capturing central bank independence accurately and/or the assumptions 
on central bank independence are in fact inappropriate.  Measuring central bank independence is 
difficult when different countries with heterogeneous market structures are subject to the 
analysis. In order to measure central bank independence, several indexes have been employed in 
the literature. The most common and comprehensive belongs to Cukierman et al. (1992). Bade 
and Parkin (1984); Alesina (1988); Grilli et al. (1991) provide alternative measures. Cukierman, 
Miller, and Neyapti (2002) updated the central bank independence index of 1992 for the 26 
former socialist economies in order to study these economies during the period of transition to 
liberalization in the 1990s. Similar studies for Latin American and Caribbean countries during the 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Cukierman (1992), Eijffinger and de Haan (1996), and Cukierman (2006), among others for a 
survey of the empirical literature, the definition of, the theory on, and the measurement of central bank 
independence. 
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1990s were conducted by Gutierrez (2003) and Jacome and Vazquez (2005). Finally, among the 
most recent studies, Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto (2005) employ the current versions of the 
OECD data that were previously studied by Grilli et al. (1991).  
 
Hayo and Hefeker (2001) stress the endogeneity issue for studies focusing on the degree of 
central bank independence and disinflation. Although a strong correlation between independence 
and low inflation exists in most cases, they argue that this finding does not imply causality since 
societies with “inflation culture” are more inflation averse and give priority to price stability as a 
policy objective and then central bank independence takes place as a result. They also propose 
other solutions to the time-inconsistency problem, such as inflation targeting or exchange rate 
based monetary policies. Another direction in the central bank independence literature is the issue 
of legal (de jure) and actual (de facto) independence of central banks. Cukierman (1993) shows 
that inflation and legal independence are in fact negatively related in developed countries and 
there exists no such relation in developing countries due to this dual aspect of central bank 
independence. 
 
3. Implementation of Inflation Targeting Regime in Turkey 
 
Transition of the monetary policy aimed at facilitating a stabilization set up within a quasi-
currency board exchange rate regime to an IT framework coupled with an independent float is not 
an easy process. This section is a brief survey of issues pertaining to the implementation of the IT 
regime in Turkey. At the onset of a switch to an IT regime certain series of prerequisites are 
expected to be fulfilled. Masson et al. (1997) argue that a central bank needs to be granted 
instrument independence; the central bank should announce a single target for monetary policy 
(any other target that might create conflicts must be avoided) and be able to implement a clear 
monetary policy with predictable effects on inflation. 
 
Granting central bank the instrument independence was the first condition that Turkey was able 
to satisfy among the prerequisites of inflation targeting. With the amendment of Central Bank 
Law in April 2001, the CBRT gained instrument independence. The primary objective of the 
central bank was stated in its charter as establishing and maintaining price stability. The law also 
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required central bank to be transparent in the conduct of the monetary policy; and inform the 
public on the conduct and performance of policies such as the departures from the inflation 
target, if there is any. The central bank was also prohibited from granting and borrowing any debt 
instrument to and from the Treasury and other public institutions.  Hence, de jure central bank 
instrument independence was achieved. We shall take a look at the implementation of the IT 
regime and empirically analyze the importance of inflation as an objective empirically and 
discuss de facto independence of the CBRT in the next section.  
 
The second prerequisite of adopting inflation targeting is having a unique target. In the presence 
of other target variables such as monetary aggregates, nominal exchange rate and unemployment 
rate, certain conflicts may arise.  The floating exchange rate regime which Turkey adopted in the 
post February crisis in 2001 however, allowed room for both an inflation and exchange rate target 
as long as the inflation target is given priority under conflicting cases and as long as the public is 
convinced that the priority is given to the inflation target. However, management of expectations 
posed a challenge. The safest and most convenient way was accepted to be the adoption of 
inflation as a single target under a floating exchange rate regime. Turkey was able to fulfill this 
prerequisite as well by choosing inflation as a credible nominal anchor. 
 
The third precondition of inflation targeting, implementing an effective and clearly-defined 
monetary policy, it can be argued, was not satisfied, due to a variety of reasons. Kara (2006) 
enumerates the challenges during the initial phase of the implementation of IT. First, because 
many stylized facts that were valid for the fixed exchange rate regime became invalid in the 
floating exchange rate regime and relationships between certain variables were uncertain, the 
economy could not be modeled easily. Second, the new regime required new types of data to be 
collected and released, such as inflation expectations. Starting 2001, the central bank started 
conducting inflation expectations surveys for the first time. Another challenge on the data side 
arose when the methodology and content of the basket comprising the consumer price index 
(CPI) was changed in 2004. This change increased the uncertainty in making inflation forecasts. 
Another issue was the change in seasonal factors and hence the challenge of identification of 
permanent and temporary factors. The third challenge is establishing credibility in the beginning 
of the new regime. The third precondition of implementing an effective and clearly defined 
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monetary policy is particularly important in order to make credible forecasts. Prior to 2002, 
inflation forecasting in Turkey was extremely difficult due to the high levels of exchange rate 
volatility, risk premium, exchange rate pass-through and dollarization (which reached historically 
high levels during the 2001 crisis) during the pre-implementation stage of inflation targeting.  
Hence, any method for inflation forecasting would clearly be unreliable under this 
macroeconomic context. 
 
In summary, during the rather short preparation phase for inflation targeting, Turkey fulfilled the 
requirement of de jure central bank independence to a great extent, while the overall 
macroeconomic conditions showed that an immediate adoption of the regime would be too early. 
Therefore, implicit inflation targeting regime was introduced for transition. 
  
Next we review briefly the developments in the initial phase of the IT regime. During the implicit 
inflation targeting period of 2002-2005, the CBRT announced its inflation and monetary targets 
one year in advance. Inflation was the main target during 2002-2005, and monetary aggregates 
were the “complementary anchors”.  Monetary aggregates were revised if any conflict occurred 
with the target inflation. 
 
It can be argued that the practice of monetary policy during the implicit IT period lacked 
transparency and the monetary policy was rather discretionary, but as the conditions improved, 
these problems were overcome gradually. Implementation of  fiscal discipline played a crucial 
role in this new disinflation program. In this sense, the central bank and the government worked 
hand in hand in order to build up credibility. This became particularly helpful in managing 
expectations. The IT regime with flexible exchange rate regime and lower fiscal dominance (see 
Table 1) seem to diminish the effectiveness of exchange rate pass-through.8 Other than lower 
debt burden and exchange rate pass through, nominal appreciation led slowly to reverse currency 
substitution (Figure 1). The banking restructuring and institutional reforms led to the 
disappearance of open position practice of the private and public sector commercial banks. With 
                                                 
8 Sometimes as a result of an outside shock that reduces the value the domestic currency, such as an increase in 
import prices, or a sudden stop in capital flows, inflation is imported to the economy. This effect is called the pass-
through effect. Kara and Öğünç (2005) provide results indicating that exchange rate pass-through was high and fast 
during the pre-2001 period and lower and slower after 2001. 
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the adoption of IT regime, the CBRT abandoned backward-looking price stability methods and 
incorporated the role of inflation expectations in the conduct of monetary policy. The former 
method had an obvious drawback: If contracts are made according to past inflation, then inflation 
tends to move with inertia.  Therefore, changing the indexation method removed an obstacle in 
combating inflation. As can be observed from Figure 4, the CBRT also seemed to have 
established credibility in terms of inflation expectations during the 2002-2005 period. 
 
(insert Figure 4 here) 
 
The CBRT released periodic reports and other statements in order to enhance transparency and 
share the information and experience gained with the public.  
 
An inflation target requires certain steps to be implemented. First, a time horizon over which the 
targeted inflation rate is to be achieved needs to be specified. Then, the choice of the appropriate 
price index should be made. Next, it should be specified whether the target is a point or a band. 
Furthermore, a list of exemptions or excuses should be defined for the cases in which the target 
gets far from being achieved. 
 
 The target inflation rate (measured in terms of CPI) set out in 2002 was 35% by the end of the 
year 2002. For years 2003 to 2005, the upper bound for the inflation targets were set as 20%, 
12% and 8%, respectively. The inflation rate gradually fell to 7.7% in end-2005 from 68% in 
end-2001. 
 
The good news on the inflation front was accompanied by reduced volatility in growth. During 
the 2002-2005 period, growth kept an increasing pace. Exchange rate and financial volatility also 
declined.9 These also contributed to the fall of Turkey’s risk premium. Both the nominal and real 
interest rates went down in the meantime, declining by about 60 percentage points from 2001 to 
2005. 
                                                 
9 Using daily Turkish data for the period between March 2001 - October 2003, Ardic and Selcuk (2006) report that 
the policies of the CBRT were aimed at containing the volatility of the exchange rate rather than affecting its level 
while acknowledging the role of favorable external factors. 
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The improvements in the macroeconomic indicators established that Turkey was ready for a full-
fledged IT regime. Indeed, at the end of 2004, the CBRT announced that the full-fledged IT 
regime will be adopted by 2006 which gave the central bank time to get prepared for the final 
requirements of inflation targeting and therefore implement the regime smoothly. At the end of 
2005, the CBRT disclosed its policy framework to the public.
 
  
 
With the new regime the CBRT set three-year target horizons and the “uncertainty bands”. The 
CBRT presented medium term inflation forecasts with the “Inflation Reports” and took 
responsibility for explaining any deviation from the target level of inflation to the predetermined 
intervals and providing the appropriate policy responses. 
 
The new regime differed from the implicit inflation targeting regime in its being more flexible in 
terms of attaining the inflation targets. The CBRT was more tolerant to shocks in the short run 
and rather aimed to approach the target in the medium run. This flexibility would naturally be 
inappropriate to apply in the preparation phase of the regime since it would pose certain risks to 
credibility. 
 
(insert Figure 5 here) 
 
Through the period 2001-2006, the central bank continuously decreased short term interest rates 
in order to maintain debt sustainability and reduce the default risk implied by higher interest 
rates. One measure of credibility is to see how the longer term interest rates respond to the central 
bank changes in the short-run interest rates. As can be observed from Figure 5, the initial 
divergence between the benchmark government security interest rates later on diminished and 
converged on the CBRT policy rates. We should note that what actually brought down inflation 
to low levels was not the interest rate policy but the continuous capital inflows which provided 
sustainability of the debt and which resulted in the appreciation of Turkish lira and alleviated the 
cost-push inflationary pressures stemming from the production side of the economy. 
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As will be discussed in more detail in the fourth section, IT regime increased the role of short-
term interest rates in the formation of expectations and demand. The CBRT kept interest rates at 
low levels until 2006. The May-June 2006 emerging market sell-off (see Figure 2) following the 
announcement by the FED that the monetary easing cycle came to an end in the U.S. in April 
2006, led to long-term interest hikes (see Figure 5) as well as an episode of new Turkish Lira 
depreciation. This resulted in questioning the appropriateness of the IT regime, but the CBRT 
responded by policy rate increases and signaled its firm stance in adhereing to the IT regime. By 
the end of 2007, the global liquidity conditions turned ?and the ensuing subprime crisis in the 
U.S. will be yet another test of the CBRT’s resolve on the IT regime. 
 
How important was the independence of the CBRT in reducing the inflation rate? Even though 
the CBRT attained de jure independence in 2001, did the CBRT act as an independent 
institution? How important was the deviation in the public’s expectations of the inflation rate 
from the CBRT’s announced target in determining the policy rates in the post-2002 period? In the 
next section, we will attempt to answer these questions by providing a structural empirical 
framework. 
 
 
 
4. Definition and Estimation Issues of the Reaction Function of a Central Bank 
 
We first review the literature on how central banks adopt targeting regimes, which can be 
described as a set of rules that are optimal for maximizing a certain objective function. To 
provide the relevant framework for the empirical analysis, we briefly introduce central bank 
preferences and define a loss function for an emerging market central bank.  We further suggest 
an augmented Taylor rule that can be derived from this loss function, which, we believe, is an 
ideal candidate to explain CBRT reactions.   
 
We begin by assuming that once a central bank becomes independent it starts implementing its 
own “targeting regime.” In general, a targeting regime can be defined by a multi-variable 
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objective function (also called the loss function) and the weights assigned to these objectives.  
While the specific set of objectives chosen by a central bank depends on its preferences, it can 
range from exchange rate specialization to output specialization.  
 
Incidentally, the first strand of literature assumes that a central bank’s objective function involves 
output (or employment) and inflation where more output is preferred to less output and inflation 
brings disutility. The central bank aims to maximize the expected value of a utility function by 
choosing inflation and output levels. A standard example of the central bank’s utility function is 
the following  
                                   2
1
( )
2
nU y yα π= − −
      (1)
 
where y  is the real output and ny  is the natural rate of the real output, and π is the inflation rate. 
In this specification, more output is always preferred with a constant marginal utility, and the 
inflation term, has an increasing marginal disutility as it enters the function in a quadratic form. 
The relative importance of output expansions is given by the parameter, α . A higher α indicates 
that the central bank is more concerned with output expansions when compared to the objective 
of inflation stabilization.     
 
The second strand of literature assumes that the central bank dislikes uncertainty (and hence 
volatility) and desires to minimize the value of a loss function that is quadratic in output and 
inflation fluctuations. In other words, instead of maximizing output at the expense of higher 
inflation, the central bank rather aims stabilization in both output and inflation. In this case, the 
loss function can be expressed as 
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1 1
( ( )) , 0
2 2
nL y y b b= − + + >π      (2) 
Since both of the arguments in equation (2) are quadratic, the central bank attempts to minimize 
both the deviations of the inflation rate from zero and the deviations of output from its natural 
rate simultaneously. Specifically, it aims at a zero inflation rate and tries to stabilize output, y , 
around ny b+ , which is higher than the equilibrium output, given that b > 0. At this point, the 
major concern is the existence of the parameter b in this loss function. A few potential 
explanations have been offered in the literature. For example, the presence of labor-market 
distortions or monopolistically competitive sectors might cause the equilibrium output to be 
lower than its efficient level (Walsh, 2003). Hence, b acts as a correction parameter. Or, the 
politicians might prefer expansionary policies in order to increase the probability of getting re-
elected, thus increasing y  above its natural rate is the desire.  
 
To investigate the behavior of a central bank empirically, one needs to assume that the central 
bank attempts to minimize the expected discounted value of a loss function similar to the one 
given above. The targeting regime relevant for our purposes is the IT regime. Similar to other 
targeting practices such as price level or income growth targeting, IT can be viewed as a task of 
minimizing a loss function which is increasing in (i) squared deviations of the actual inflation 
from target inflation and (ii) squared deviations of the actual output from the potential output. 
Since the emphasis in an IT regime is on inflation, the level of output matters to the extent that it 
affects inflation. In this respect, potential output is the relevant measure as a benchmark for 
inflationary pressures. In an IT framework, the central bank is concerned with output being above 
the potential output because this may create inflationary pressures through two channels: 
potential output might be falling, which indicates a supply side pressure, or actual output might 
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be rising which indicates a demand side pressure. 
 
Under these assumptions the loss function takes the form:   
2 2
0
1
[ ( ( ) ( ) ) | (0)]
1
t
y t i y t t
t
L E y y Iα π π α
ρ
∞
∗ ∗
+
=
 
= − + − + 
∑
   (3)
 
where E is the expectation operator,  ρ   is the discount rate,  t i+π   is the i-period ahead inflation, 
π ∗  is the target inflation (announced by the central bank), y t   is the actual output level at period t 
and 
ty
∗   is the (unobservable) potential output. I(0) captures the information set available to the 
central bank at period 0. The loss function in (3) is forward-looking because policy decisions 
taken in period t may affect future inflation and output, and therefore the central bank must make 
its decisions based on the forecasts of future inflation. In this policy setup, both measuring 
inflationary expectations and correctly forecasting the end-of-period inflation are crucial. 
 
Once the objective function is defined as in equation (3), the next step is to translate it into 
optimal decision rules about the instruments. There have been several successful attempts in the 
literature to derive optimal instrument rules using the above objective function in a general 
equilibrium context (Walsh, 2003). The most commonly known of the optimal decision rules was 
put forward by Taylor (1993). Taylor suggested that the central bank responds to output gap, 
defined as the difference between actual and potential output, and the inflation gap, defined as the 
difference between expected inflation and its target. The Taylor rule and its variants have been 
shown to be a fair description of the behavior of the central banks targeting inflation.   
 
Taylor suggested that for each percent deviation of the expected inflation from the inflation target 
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the central bank should increase the interest rate by more than one percent. This has also become 
known as the Taylor principle. The idea underlying the principle is that since nominal rates 
increase naturally one-for-one with expected inflation, the central bank should increase the 
nominal rates more than one-for-one to have an increase in the real rate. In policy terms, this 
amounts to increasing the overnight interbank rate by more than one percent as a response to a 
one percent increase in expected inflation.  This rule can be expressed as:  
                        (( ) | ( )) ( )t t i t t ti E I t y yϕ β π π γ ε
∗ ∗
+= + − + − +      (4) 
where β  is expected to be greater than one.  Here, the central bank sets its policy rate, 
t
i , in 
order to reach its annual inflation target,  
t
∗π  given the information set I(t) at period t and tε  is a 
zero mean  independently and identically distributed shock. 
 
Although the above rule has been accepted to be a fairly successful description of the central 
bank behavior (Clarida et al., 2000), the practice shows that the central banks adjust the interest 
rates more smoothly than the above rule suggests. In other words, although overnight rates move 
in the same direction as suggested by the rule, the magnitudes of the movements are smaller and 
occur in a series of hikes or falls. This type of a rule can be described as an inertial Taylor rule 
where today’s rate depends on yesterday’s rate besides output gap and expected inflation gap. 
The inertial rule can also be explained using the idea that today’s overnight rate movements 
signal the future rate movements.10 These rules can be estimated empirically in the following 
form:  
1 (( ) | ( )) ( )t t t i t t ti i E I t y y
∗ ∗
− += + + − + − +ϕ α β π π γ ε      (5) 
 
                                                 
10 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2008) find that with both sticky wages and sticky prices, the inertial Taylor rule performs 
better than the standard rule in reducing inflation.   
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While equation (5) explains the central bank behavior in developed economies fairly well, it 
ignores several important features that are specific to emerging markets. We briefly explore those 
features below and suggest a rule for the CBRT that may explain its behavior in the post-2001 
period.  
 
5. Reaction Function and Independence of the CBRT 
 
One of the explanations put forward as to why the CBRT has been successful in bringing down 
inflation to single digits in the post-2001 period following two decades of high inflation is the de 
jure independence it gained after the 2001 crisis.  While there may be other explanations of how 
inflation was reduced, one can easily argue that the flexible exchange rate regime coupled with 
the successful implementation of the IT regime adopted by the CBRT in the post-2001 period 
was the main reason.  
 
In this section, we explore how the CBRT’s reaction function has changed in the post-2001 
period in order to understand the effect of independence on the actual implementation of the 
monetary policy.  We test this rule using pre- and post-crisis Turkish data and present the results.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, while equation (5) explains the central bank behavior in 
developed economies fairly well, it ignores several important features that are specific to 
emerging markets. First, equation (5) ignores the role of exchange rate volatility, which affects 
the behavior of the CBRT (or any other emerging market economy’s central bank). There are 
four dimensions of the effect of exchange rate volatility on the central bank behavior. The first 
dimension regards the effect of exchange rate movements on inflationary expectations because of 
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the pass-through to domestic price indices via imported consumption and manufactured goods. In 
this respect, these movements may also have an effect on the second policy input, the output gap, 
by changing the marginal rate of substitution between labor and capital when capital consists of 
at least partially of imported machinery. Therefore, the CBRT might intervene to prevent the 
pass-through of exchange rate movements to prices to achieve its preset inflation target.11 The 
second dimension is the relatively high degree of dollarization and open positions of commercial 
banks, which may cause the CBRT to be more sensitive to a possible sudden capital flight. The 
third dimension is the relative importance of the export sector. There has been a considerable 
amount of lobbying by the pressure groups, including some members of the government, to 
devalue the Turkish currency on the grounds to achieve higher competitiveness and to improve 
the current account balance.12 The fourth and final dimension is the fiscal sustainability 
dimension. Having some portion of the public debt linked to foreign exchange may also cause a 
not-so-independent central bank to care about exchange rate movements. 
 
Second, the CBRT might be more prone to regime shifts or structural breaks in its policy 
function. For example, even the process of appointing of a new governor, such as the process 
experienced in 2006, might lead to a structural break in the reaction function. Such shifts cannot 
be represented by the class of linear Taylor rules, as suggested above in equations (4) and (5). 
Estimating a Taylor rule for the purpose of describing policymaker behavior in this case would 
                                                 
11 Taylor (2001) suggests that rules that do not include exchange rates are essentially closed economy rules, which 
embed? movements of the exchange rates in the fluctuations of the interest rates. Therefore, one can expect that 
including the exchange rates as separate inputs in Taylor rules might improve the fit of the model. Taylor (2001) 
finds no support for a role in exchange rates in the estimation of Taylor rules. 
12 As explained previously, central bank independence is a prerequisite for a successful IT regime as it allows the 
central bank to act on a well-defined set of pre-announced rules. However, adjusting exchange rates under political 
pressures might create the impression that the central bank is not acting independently. In this context, the behaviour 
and actions of the CBRT after the adoption of the IT regime provides a laboratory in which we can study whether 
and how these pressures were handled without losing credibility that is essential for the success of the IT regime. 
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require appropriate modeling of such policy shifts.  Below, we suggest a model for explaining the 
behavior of the CBRT that takes into account the role of exchange rates and regime shifts. 
             1 (( ) | ( )) ( )t t t t t t i t t t t t ti i E I t y y q
∗ ∗
− += + + − + − + +ϕ α β π π γ δ ε    (6) 
where q represents a function of the nominal exchange rate that can either be specified as the 
nominal exchange rate itself  or gap of exchange rate defined as the deviation from its trend.  We 
let the coefficient ϕ  vary with respect to time to reflect regime shifts. Since our aim is to 
compare the CBRT behavior before and after independence, we also let other coefficientsα , β ,γ  
and δ vary with respect to time.13   
 
(insert Figure 6 here) 
 
The third term in expectations is what we call the “credibility gap”. That is to say how the 
expectations of future inflation rate deviates from the target inflation rate. Figure 6 plots the 
inflation credibility gap in the post-2002 period and the CBRT policy rate. The inflation 
credibility gap is obtained as follows. We obtain 12-month-ahead inflation expectations and we 
subtracted the moving average level of year-end target of the CBRT announcements from these. 
For a de facto independent central bank one would expect to see a higher weight, β, on this term. 
Hence in equation (6), one would like to see that the coefficient of inflation is significantly higher 
after 2001 than that for the period before 2001 since the CBRT started inflation targeting after the 
2001 crisis. Moreover, this coefficient is expected to be positive and greater than one. This 
                                                 
13 Note that variable coefficients imply that the model we estimate is nonlinear. Moreover, estimating the unobserved 
variables, such as potential output requires a different approach than ordinary least squares. We handle both 
problems using a dual extended Kalman filter technique. For the details of the estimation methodology and a 
thorough explanation of the theoretical considerations in implementing the above rule see Hatipoglu and Alper 
(2009). 
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simply reflects the fact that the CBRT should increase the interest rate more than the increase in 
the actual inflation to achieve a net increase in the real rate as a response to increase in 
inflationary expectations. 
 
(insert Figure 7 here) 
 
Figure 7 shows the results of our estimations. In the pre- and post-crisis period, there is a 
significant difference in the mean levels of inflation coefficient, which indicates that the CBRT 
attached different weights on inflation gap in these two periods. While there has been an increase 
in the inflation coefficient in the pre-crisis period, the coefficient hovers around one implying that 
the CBRT was not fighting inflation in an aggressive manner.14 In the post-crisis period there has 
been a steady increase in the inflation coefficient reflecting the fact that the CBRT was more 
concerned with fiscal dominance in the initial phases of the IT period. Moreover, the increasing 
coefficient of the inflation gap in the second sub-period indicates that the CBRT has adopted a 
more independent position compared to the pre-crisis period. This is especially evident if we also 
consider the developments in terms of the coefficient of the exchange rate in the reaction 
function.  The coefficient of the exchange rate turns out to be negative and insignificant across 
the whole sample.15  We find no trend in the coefficient of the exchange rate indicating that the 
CBRT has adopted a consistent independent stance in the post-2001 period against the political 
pressures that are mentioned above. 
 
                                                 
14 We assume that the inflation target for the pre-crisis period is zero. Although this is not a realistic scenario, even a 
central bank that fights inflation aggressively and has a less ambitious inflation target should have a coefficient of 
inflation greater than one in its loss function. See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) for a detailed explanation of the 
magnitude of the inflation coefficient. 
15 The coefficient of the exchange rate at the last observation is –0.65 with a standart deviaton of 1.47. 
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6. Conclusion 
Misconducted macroeconomic policies in the past resulting in huge public debt prevented a 
healthy conduct of monetary policy in Turkey. It is a lesson that removing fiscal dominance 
and switching to the right regime that provides the central bank with independence are crucial 
to combat inflation. 
    
The pre-crisis period was characterized by a fragile financial system, high dependency on short 
term capital inflows, and high levels of public debt. Nevertheless, the aim was to reduce 
inflation, which could only be reached in the post-crisis period after performing fundamental 
reforms.  The 2000 and 2001 crises demonstrated what was wrong (the financial sector), and 
the necessary steps to cure the problems were taken. Among these steps, the benefits of an 
independent central bank has been discussed. It is an obvious fact that a well-coordinated fiscal 
and monetary policy lead the economy to the more desirable macroeconomic outcomes.   
 
Finally, in order to estimate the reaction function of the CBRT we proposed an augmented 
Taylor rule is suitable for a highly dollarized economy operating in a floating exchange rate 
regime. We provide evidence that after gaining de jure independence in 2001, the CBRT has 
fought inflation more aggressively and hence was de facto independent, more so in the later 
periods. 
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008*
Total Public Sector Debt/GDP 74.13 69.31 62.24 56.67 51.14 45.60 39.09 37.58
Domestic Debt/GDP 50.85 42.76 42.74 40.16 37.72 33.16 29.91 28.15
Cash Debt/GDP 24.29 25.47 28.69 29.62 29.92 27.48 25.84 24.56
Non-cash Debt/GDP 26.56 17.29 14.05 10.54 7.80 5.68 4.07 3.58
Floating Rate Notes/GDP 25.37 18.29 18.29 16.12 16.24 13.89 13.14 12.43
FX and FX-indexed Debt/GDP 18.10 13.75 9.37 7.06 5.84 4.57 3.06 2.30
Fixed Rate Notes/GDP 7.39 10.72 15.09 16.98 15.63 14.70 13.71 13.42
Total External Debt /GDP 23.27 26.55 19.50 16.51 13.42 12.44 9.18 9.43
IMF Debt/GDP 0.27 6.52 5.15 4.44 3.04 2.01 0.98 1.33
Other Multilateral Loans/GDP 3.89 9.69 7.27 6.35 4.61 3.63 2.36 2.71
Eurobonds/GDP 12.08 10.79 8.24 7.16 6.55 6.79 5.30 5.19
Commercial loans/GDP 3.54 2.94 1.87 1.43 1.17 1.07 0.84 0.85
Bilateral Loans/GDP 3.76 3.13 2.12 1.58 1.09 0.95 0.67 0.68
* End-June value for 2008
Source: Turkish Treasury and authors' own calculations
Table 1: Structure of Turkish Public Sector Debt (%)
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